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Abstract 
This paper relates comparative belief structures and a 
general view of belief management in the setting of 
deductively closed logical representations of accepted 
beliefs. We show that the range of compatibility 
between the classical deductive closure and uncertain 
reasoning covers precisely the nonmonotonic 
'preferential' inference system of Kraus, Lehmann 
and Magidor and nothing else. In terms of uncertain 
reasoning any possibility or necessity measure gives 
birth to a structure of accepted beliefs. The classes of 
probability functions and of Shafer's belief functions 
which yield belief sets prove to be very special ones. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
There is an old controversy in the framework of Artificial 
Intelligence between probabilistic and other numerical 
representations of uncertainty on the one hand, and the 
symbolic setting of logical reasoning methods on the 
other hand. The emergence and relative success of some 
numerical reasoning formalisms based on probability 
(especially Bayesian networks) or fuzzy sets has led AI to 
accept numerical representations as complementary to 
symbolic ones. However the basic issue underlying the 
controversy, that is to say, whether or not the two forms 
of reasoning (logical and numerical) are at all compatible 
at the formal level, has not been widely addressed. Namely 
if the beliefs of an agent are represented simultaneously by 
a measure of confidence (such as a probability function for 
instance) on a set of states and by a logical knowledge 
base that accounts for the propositions sanctioned by this 
measure of confidence, two questions are worth 
investigating: 
• to what extent are inferences drawn from the 
measure of confidence and inferences drawn from the 
logical knowledge base coherent? 
• to what extent can the revisions of the measure of 
confidence (via conditioning) and of the knowledge base, 
upon arrival of an input information, be coherent as well? 
These questions have been considered in the past only 
indirectly and with respect to particular uncertainty 
theories, basically probability theory (Kyburg 1988). This 
paper addresses the problem by trying to relate a general 
view of belief revision in the setting of deductively closed 
logical representations (belief sets of Giirdenfors, 1988), 
and comparative belief structures, that is relations 
comparing events, in terms of relative likelihood, certainty, 
plausibility and the like. Such relations can be induced by 
numerical representations of belief such as probability, 
possibility (Lewis 1973; Dubois 1986), Shafer's belief 
functions (Wong et al. 1991). The single assumption of 
deductive closure for belief sets severely restricts the type 
of comparative belief structure that can be envisaged for 
reasoning under uncertainty. Actually, we show that the 
range of compatibility between the classical deductive 
closure and uncertain reasoning precisely covers the kind 
of nonmonotonic inference system called preferential by 
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990), and nothing else. 
Our work is closely related to findings of Halpern (1996) 
who investigates how to lift a partial order on states to a 
partial order on events in the style of possibility theory 
and of Friedman and Halpern (1996) that describe the 
semantics of nonmonotonic inference in terms of 
confidence relations. The present paper makes a step 
further: it considers a larger class of confidence relations 
and extends Friedman and Halpern's results about the 
representation of partial preorders that are in accordance 
with preferential entailment. Moreover, while (Friedman 
and Halpern 1996) mainly focuses on equipping 
preferential inference with a semantics in terms of 
uncertainty relations, we are also interested in checking the 
consistency between the notion of logical closure and the 
various numerical theories of uncertainty: probability 
measures, possibility and necessity measures (Zadeh 1978), 
belief and plausibility functions (Shafer 1976). Thus, the 
paper should be also viewed as a continuation of a previous 
paper by two of the authors (Dubois, Prade 1995b ). 
Section 2 gives the background on confidence relations and 
belief revision. Section 3 introduces the general framework 
of partial acceptance preorders, which are partial preorders 
compatible with logical consequence and conditioning; 
examples and discussions are provided; links with system 
P are presented in the last part of Section 3. Section 4 
studies characteristic properties and consequences of 
additivity in this framework, and a representation theorem 
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of any acceptance preorder by a family of complete 
acceptance preorders is given. Section 5 focuses on 
complete acceptance preorders, and more precisely on those 
that follow from well-known numerical confidence 
measures. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 CONFIDENCE RELATIONS 
Usually, in uncertainty theories, an agent builds a 
comparative belief structure, as a relation ;:::: among events 
A, B, C, i.e., subsets of a set of states S (in the 
following, we assume that S is finite). A ;:::: B means that 
the agent's confidence in A is at least as great as his 
confidence in B. From this confidence relation, associated 
relations are defined in a classical way: 
• A >  B iff(A  C: B) and not (B C: A)- strict preference; 
• A 11 B iff neither (A C: B) nor (A C: B)- incomparability; 
• A = B iff (A C: B) and (B C: A) - equivalence. 
Notice that, in order to tell incomparability from 
equivalence, we do not suppose that ;:::: is complete (this 
generalizes usual confidence measures, that define a 
complete preorder, i.e. where either A ;:::: B or B ;:::: A since 
mapping to a numerical scale). A confidence relation is 
naturally transitive but the incomparability relation it 
induces is not necessarily so. Moreover if A � B, then A 
and B are comparable and confidence in A cannot be 
strictly greater than the one in B: this forbids situations 
where a proposition would be more believed than another 
it semantically entails. In summary the main assumption 
concerning a confidence relation are: 
Transitivity (T): A C: B and B C: C imply A C: C 
Monotony with respect to inclusion (MI ) :  
A!:;; B ==? B C: A. 
MI is a weak form of the orderly axiom of Halpern (1996): 
Axiom 0: if A !:;; A' and B'!:;; B then A > B ==?A' > B' 
The following properties follow from T and MI : 
• Reflexivity of;:::: and thus of=; 
• Transitivity of > and=; 
• Irretlexivity of > (IR) : A > A does not hold (A > A 
makes no sense); 
• Compatibility with logical entailment for both ;:::: and >: 
if A �  A' and B' � B then A;:::: B ==?A';:::: B'. 
if A �  A' and B' � B then A > B ==? A' > B' (Axiom 0). 
Some confidence relations are usually specified by defining 
a stability property on the relation A ;:::: B with respect to 
adding new elements to sets A and B or deleting common 
elements (Fishburn 1986; Dubois 1986) : 
Definition 1 (additivity). Let A, B and C be any three 
events such that A n (B u C) = (2). A relation C: is 
additive iff A u B C: A u C <=> B C: C. 
Denoting ;:::T the dual of;::::, such that A ;:::T B iff B ;:::: A, it 
can be checked that additive relations are self dual, i.e., 
additive confidence relations are such A ;:::: B iff B ;:::: A. For 
instance, comparative probabilities (Fishburn 1986) are 
additive confidence relations. There are well-known 
confidence relations that are not additive and not even self­
dual, e.g., those based on Shafer's belief or plausibility 
functions. For instance, consider the basic probability 
assignment m with two disjoint focal elements E and F 
such that m(E) < m(F), and two events A and B such as E 
� A, A n  B = 0, F n A= 0, F n B :;t:0 and Fn B :;t:0 ; then 
Bel(A) = m(E) > Bel(B)=O while Pl(A) = m(E) < Pl(B) = 
m(F), in spite of the fact that Bel and Pl are dual. This 
would suggest, when ;:::: is not self-dual, to study both the 
relation defined by A ;:::: B and the one defined by B ;:::: A . 
Besides, for confidence relations which are not self-dual, it 
is possible to add two further requirements in order to 
distinguish respectively between the two kinds of relations 
generated by duality, namely 
• not( A =  0 and A = 0) for possibility-like relations 
• not( A =  S and A = S) for certainty-like relations. 
2.2 ACCEPTED BELIEFS AND BELIEF REVISION 
The classical logic approach to belief representation 
considers a set B of propositions <jl, 'If, ... as a set of 
explicit beliefs of an agent, from which it is possible to 
infer implicit beliefs. The set of consequences of B is the 
set of "rationally" accepted beliefs also called a belief set 
K (Gardenfors 1988). In order to relate belief sets and 
confidence relations, we identify events to sets [<jl] of 
models of propositions <jl, and we must decide what it 
means for a proposition to be accepted by a confidence 
relation. The weakest and most natural way is to say that 
<jl is an accepted belief if and only if the agent is more 
confident in <jl than in its negation: [<jl] > [-,<jl] ( or 
equivalently [ <jl] > [ (ji] ). In this paper we shall use the 
event-like notation: A > A when A is accepted, which is 
also equivalent to A >T A. 
Since a belief set is deductively closed, the compatibility 
between the confidence relation and the belief set requires 
that any consequence of an accepted belief is an accepted 
belief and that the conjunction of two accepted beliefs is 
an accepted belief (Dubois, Prade 1995b ): 
• Consequence stability (CS): 
if A � B and A >A then B > B 
• AND rule: if A > A and B > B then A n B > A u B. 
A belief is tentatively accepted and may be questioned by 
the arrival of new information. Hence the compatibility 
between belief sets and confidence relations must take into 
account the dynamics of belief. When an input information 
arrives as a proposition 'I' that must be true, the belief set 
K is revised into K*'lf, that is, a belief set that contains 
'I'. Rationality axioms which specify how a revision 
operator should behave, especially when the initial belief 
set is contradictory with 'If, have been proposed 
(Gardenfors 1988). Here we shall assume nothing but the 
success postulate ('I' E K*'l') and the deductive closure of 
K*'lf. 
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Revising a confidence relation by an input C = [\jl] comes 
down to restricting the relation to subsets of C. This is 
called conditioning. There is more confidence in A than in 
B, conditioned on C if and only if A n  C > B n C. The 
set of accepted beliefs when C holds is thus 
A>(C) ={A: A n C > An C} I. The close connection 
between belief revision theory and conditioning is 
noticeable since, using Grove's dual >a of an epistemic 
entrenchment (Gardenfors 1988) and a belief set K, the set 
of accepted events corresponding to the revised belief set 
JS*\jl by an input \jl is precisely A>a(C) ={A: A n C >a 
A n C} (with C = [\jl] ). Note that in terms of the 
epistemic entrenchme.!_lt itself (�>E C gf C >a A) we also 
haveA>a(C) ={A: A u C >E A u  C}. More generally, 
the latter (with any confidence relation > T instead of >E) 
could be used as an equivalent definition of A>(C). Mind 
t h a t  A > ( C )  is n o t  e q u a l  to A > T( C )  in g e n e r a l .  
Compatibility with the revision of belief sets leads thus to 
require that A>(C) is deductively closed, as K*\jl is. It leads 
to require conditional versions of CS and the AND rule: 
• Conditional consequence stability (CCS): 
if A s= B and C n A > C n A then C n B > C n B; 
• Conditional AND rule ( CAND ): 
ifC nA > C n A and C nB > C n B 
then C n A n B > C n (A u B). 
CCS and CAND give the CS and AND rules when C = S. 
In this paper, we try to characterise the common ground 
between confidence relations and revisable belief sets, i.e., 
confidence relation satisfying T, MI and CAND (CCS is 
implied by MI). These kinds of orders, that may be partial, 
will be called partial acceptance preorders so as to stress 
their compatibility with closed sets of accepted beliefs. 
3 PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE PREORDER 
Let S be a set of states, 2S a set of events, and � be a 
partial order on 2S that satisfies T and MI. It is easy to see 
that CCS and CAND can be written as follows (A, B, C, 
D being disjoint events): 
• CCS: A > B u C =>A u C > B; 
• CAND: A u B > C u D and A u C > B u D 
=>A > B u C u D. 
l This is a natural definition of revision on the basis of a confidence 
relation. Indeed, in numerical uncertainty theories, conditioning has 
been studied axiomatically by Cox (1961) using the following 
equation: g(AIC) is a solution to the equality g(AnC) = g(AIC)*g(C) 
where * is continuous and strictly monotonic in both places. Then the 
only possible solution is * = product. Then g(AIC) > g( AIC) if and 
only if g(AnC) > g(AnC).The equivalence holds when g is a 
probability, a plausibility function or a possibility measure, using 
Dempster rule of conditionning or its qualitative counterpart in 
possibility theory setting, which remains in the spirit of Cox's above 
conditioning equation. However, the equivalence does not hold for 
the dual conditional measures of the form gT(AIB) = 1- g(AIB). 
In fact, as soon as T and MI are assumed, it is enough to 
add the following axiom introduced in (Dubois, Prade 
1995b; Friedman and Halpern 1996): 
Acceptance Axiom (Ac): \iA,B,C three disjoint events, 
A u B >  C and A u C >B=>A>B u C . 
The CCS property is recovered from axiom MI and the 
CAND property is equivalent to Ac in presence of axiom 
MI. Thus, we will define partial acceptance preorders by: 
Definition 2: a relation � on a set of events is an 
acceptance preorder iff it satisfies T, MI and Ac. The 
relation > induced by an acceptance preorder will be called 
a partial acceptance order. 
Note that the dual of an acceptance preorder is generally 
not an acceptance preorder, except of course for self-dual 
relations. Partial acceptance orders are characterized by: 
Proposition 1 : Any partial acceptance order is 
irreflexive, transitive and satisfies 0 and A c. Reciprocally, 
if > is irreflexive, transitive and satisfies 0 and Ac then it 
is a partial acceptance order induced by the relation � 
defined by A � B iff A > B or B s= A. Relation � is an 
acceptance preorder such that (A =B iff A=B). 
Sketch of proof: The strict part of an acceptance order is obviously 
irreflexive, transitive and satisfies 0. It satisfies Ac by definition. 
Suppose that >- is an irreflexive and transitive that satisfies 0 and Ac. 
The relation <= defined in Proposition I satisfies MI by definition and 
clearly induces >-. It obviously satisfies Ac. It is transitive since: 
- if A >- B and B >- C, A >- C and thus A <= C 
- if A >- B and Q;;;B, by 0, A >- C and thus A<= C 
- if B,;;A and B >- C, by 0, A >- C and thus A 2= C 
- if B,;;A and C,;;B, C,;;A and thus A � C. 
Moreover, A=B implies obviously A =B. A = B implies (A >- B or 
B,;;A) and (B >- A or A,;;B). Since A,;;B implies that not(A >- B), we 
have: B,;;A and A,;;B. 
Moreover, any acceptance preorder satisfies the characteristic 
property of acceptance functions (Dubois, Prade 1995b ): 
Proposition 2: 3 K s= S, K # (Z), such that : 
\7' A s= S, A > A <=> K s= A. 
The set K is nothing but the intersection of all A's such 
that A > A and is the most specific belief induced by the 
partial acceptance order. We can also prove a new and more 
general property, that includes the dynamics of partial 
acceptance orders and which thus holds for context-tolerant 
acceptance functions: 
Proposition 3 \7' B s= S, if B > (Z), then 3 K B s= S such 
that K B # (Z) and \7' A s= S, A n B > A n B <=> K B s= A 
KB _!s actually the intersection of all the A such that A n 
B >A n B. Proposition 2 is retrieved when B = S. 
3.1 EXAMPLES 
Well known examples of acceptance preorders are necessity 
and possibility orders (Dubois, 1986; Dubois, Prade 
1995b). Let us recall that a necessity measure N is such 
that: N(A) E [0,1] and N(A n B) = min(N(A), N(B)). The 
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dual set function il(A) = 1 - N(A.) such that ll(A u B) = 
m a x (ll (A), ll(B)) is a possibility measure. More 
precisely, for dual pair(N, ll) of set functions, ;;::N and :2':n 
which are the dual necessity and possibility orders induced 
by N and ll respectively are acceptance preorders. 
Necessity orders are described by Giirdenfors (1988) under 
the name epistemic entrenchment. Indeed, any rational 
revision is driven by a complete preorder on events whose 
only numerical representatives are the necessity measures 
N of possibility theory . The set of accepted beliefs An = 
{A, A > NA} ={A, A > n A} is deductively closed and is a 
semantic description of a belief set. Moreover the 
conditioned set A n(C)= {A, A n  C >n A n C} is also 
deductively closed and satisfies all postulates of rational 
revision (Dubois, Prade 1992). Hence the strict part of a 
possibility order is a partial acceptance order. 
Since the Giirdenfors revision theory underlies a particular 
confidence relation, it naturally suggests that any 
confidence relation might in turn lead to a revision theory 
for belief sets. However a strict order on events induced by 
a probability measure is generally not an acceptance order 
as it violates the AND rule. This has been noticed a long 
time ago by Kyburg (1961) and is the basis of the lottery 
paradox (one can believe that any given player in a one­
winner game will lose, all the more so as players are 
numerous, but one cannot believe that all of them will lose). 
Possibility orders and necessity orders are acceptance 
preorders, where any pair of events is comparable. 
Requiring the full comparability of events (i.e., requiring 
completeness) makes sense if the confidence order stems 
from a numerical set function, as studied in Section 5. But 
the incomparability is often not transitive. For instance, 
let n be a possibility function and consider the partial 
order >nsup introduced in (Dubois et a! 1997): 
A >nsup B 
A :2':nsup B 
iff ll(A n B) > ll( A n B) 
iff N(A u B) >  N(B u A); 
iff A >nsup B or B � A. 
:2':nsup is a partial acceptance preorder and >nsup is a self­
dual partial acceptance order that refines >n (A > n  B 
implies A >nsup B) by comparing only the non-common 
part of events (If A and B are disjoint, A >nsup B iff A > n  
B ,  and then A n(C) = A_nsup(C)l). But � nsup IS gene�ally 
not transitive: ll(A n B) = ll( A n B) and ll(B n C) = 
D(B n C) do not imply ll(A n C) = ll(A n C). 
Other examples of partial acceptance orders are orderly 
"qualitative" relations where a relation > on 2S is 
"qualitative" in the sense of Halpern iff: 
• V A,B,C A u B > C and AuC > B :::::> A >  BuC (Qual) 
• > satisfies the orderly axiom 0. 
Halpern(1996) never supposes anything about reflexivity 
or irreflexivity. Anyway, Qual is much stronger than Ac 
since it applies to any A,B,C (not necessarily disjoint). 
Partial acceptance preorders encompass reflexive orderly 
qualitative relations and partial acceptance orders 
encompass irreflexive orderly relations. Indeed, any 
reflexive orderly qualitative relation is a an acceptance 
preorder and any irreflexive qualitative orderly relation is a 
partial acceptance order. But there are acceptance 
preorders2 as well as partial acceptance orders3 that are not 
"qualitative" in the sense of Halpern. 
The framework of acceptance (pre )-orders thus takes a step 
further beyond orderly qualitative preference relations, be 
they reflexive or irreflexive. It does not encompass the 
case of relations that are neither reflexive, nor irreflexive ­
but can they be understood as confidence relations when 
A > A for some A ? 
3.2 RELATIONS WITH SYSTEM P 
This framework is mainly the one proposed by 
Friedman and Halpern (1996), except that we do not need 
to assume their axiom A3 (that requires that A =  B = 0 
implies AuB = 0). Indeed this axiom does not agree with 
belief functions or necessity measures for instance. 
Anyway, it remains true that any partial acceptance order 
satisfies the main axioms of system P and that, 
reciprocally, the order on disjoint events induced by a 
conditional knowledge base is an acceptance one. 
More precisely, recall that several semantics of 
nonmonotonic logic lead to a strict order between disjoint 
events induced by a conditional knowledge base satisfying 
the postulates of preferential inference of (Kraus, Lehmann 
and Magidor 1990). Let <1> 1--' 'I' be a conditional assertion, 
stating that if <1> holds then generally 'I' holds too. A partial 
order> on disjoint events is induced by a set of conditional 
assertions by interpreting <1> 1--' 'I' as the statement that the 
conjunction <\>A 'I' is more plausible than <1> A -,\j/: 
<1> �--' 'I' ¢:::? [ <1>] n ['I'] > [ <1> ] n [-,\j/] (*) 
In this context, well-known properties of nonmonotonic 
preferential inference can be written as properties of the 
confidence order> :  
Or: AnC > An C, BnC > Bn C 
:::::> (AuB)nC > (AuB)n C 
Rw: B �C , AnB > AnB:::::>AnC>AnC 
Cm: AnB > An B and AnC> An C 
:::::> AnBnC> AnBn C 
Cut: AnB > An B and AnBnC> AnBn C 
:::::> AnC > An C. 
Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor (1990) also assume the 
reflexivity axiom A 1--' A, which is hard to accept in the 
present framework since it means A > 0 for all A (and 
thus 0 > 0!): this violates our antireflexivity requirement 
for >. Even the Restricted Reflexivity (RR) axiom (If 
A:;t:0, A > 0) is questionable in our context, since we aim 
at encompassing uncertainty theories: axiom RR indeed 
2 Consider for instance the reflexive relation <'= on S = { s I ,s2} 
satisfying MI, whose strict part is { s I, s2} > { s 1} > { s2}. Relation <'= 
is an acceptance preorder that does not satisfy (QUAL). I ndeed : 
{sl} v {sl};:: {s2} and {sl} v {s2};:: {sl} but {sl} <': {sl} v {s2} 
does not hold. 
3For instance: S={sl,s2},{sl,s2}>{si}>{s2}> 0 satisfies AND, 0, 
IR, T but not Qual . 
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enforces any non-contradictory event to be somewhat 
plausible. However, in the context of uncertainty theories, 
one may often wish to express that A is impossible even 
if A -:;:. 0 (for instance, null sets in probability theory 1). 
Anyway, this is easily remedied by introducing the 
following Consistency Preservation axiom, that is an 
obvious consequence of MI: 
CP: Whatever A, 0 > A does not hold. 
It is easy to show that partial acceptance orders are induced 
by conditional assertions in the above sense and that it 
reciprocally turns out that the entailment relation induced 
by a partial acceptance order is not more general than 
preferential inference, but for the reflexivity A fv A: 
Proposition 4: if L1 is a conditional knowledge base 
closed under CAND, OR, RW, CM, CUT, and CP, then 
the confidence relation it defines via (*) is a partial 
acceptance order on disjoint events. 
Theorem 1:  The strict part of any confidence preorder 
that satisfies T, MI and Ac also satisfies CAND, RW, 
CM, CUT, OR, CP. If A > 0 whenever A :t= 0, the 
corresponding family of conditional assertions satisfies 
system P but for A = 0. 
The main difference between Friedman's and Halpern's 
axiomatic and ours comes from a different understanding of 
system P on our side. In (Friedman and Halpern 1996), the 
need for A3 comes from the interpretation of <1> fv \jf as : <I> 
fv \jf {:::} ( [ <1>] n [ 'lf] > [ <1> ] n [--, \jf] or [ <1>] = 0). Our 
simpler interpretation <1> fv \jf {:::} ([<!>] rt [\jf] > [<I> ] rt 
[--,\jf]) allows us to drop A3. Actually, we never assume 
that the inference <1> fv \jf holds when [<!>] is empty or 
impossible and we drop the reflexivity <I> fv <1> of system P. 
4. ADDITIVE AND NON-ADDITIVE 
ACCEPTANCE PREORDERS 
Friedman and Halpern (1996) show that, if 2: is a 
transitive relation that satisfies MI, Ac and A3, the strict 
part of 2: restricted to disjoint events can be represented by 
a family of complete acceptance preorders that also satisfy 
these properties. From Theorem 1, it is easy to show that 
it is still the case if even A3 is not assumed4. But this 
representation of an acceptance preorder by means of 
families of complete preorders proposed in (Friedman and 
Halpern 1996) is not fully satisfying; the comparison of 
non-disjoint events cannot be deduced from the comparison 
of disjoint events, unless the acceptance order is supposed 
to be additive. Recall that additivity means that, for any A, 
B and C such that A rt (BuC) = 0, A u  B 2: A u C {:::} 
B 2: C. If 2: is additive, then, for any A, B, C such that 
Art(BuC) = 0: 
4 Indeed, the restriction of > to disjoint events is equivalent to a 
consistent closed base of defaults, and such a belief base can be 
represented by a family of possibility measures (following Dubois, 
Prade (1995a)), even if RR is not assumed: if A u B >A= B = 0 for 
some A and B, a possibility of 0 is assigned to A in some of the 
possibility measures, a possibility of 0 is assigned to B in the other 
ones : hence, it may hold that A u B > 0 although A= B = 0. 
• A u  B =A u C {:::} B = C; 
• A u B > A u C {:::} B > C. 
If additivity is assumed, the relation > can thus be soundly 
reconstructed as well as an acceptance preorder, using 
Proposition 1, but this is not necessarily the original one. 
In other terms, the acceptance preorders that can be 
soundly recomputed from the knowledge of > among 
disjoint events are those such that two disjoint events are 
never equivalent. Otherwise, the distinction between 
equivalence and incomparability can be lost. 
However, in the context of acceptance, there is a strong 
incompatibility between the existence of equivalent 
disjoint events and additivity. Indeed, acceptance preorders 
have the following highly possibilistic property: 
Proposition 5. Let A, B and C be three disjoint events. 
If;;:;: is an acceptance preorder, then: 
C=A >B:::::>A =AuB=C=CuB >B 
Proof: Since A > B and C = A , then C u A > B and C u B � A. I t  is 
impossible to have CuB> A (otherwise, by Ac, C >Au B and thus C 
> A). Then C u B =A, i.e. by transitivity C u B =C. 
In other terms, if C =A > B, then B is negligible when 
compared to A. Additivity rules out the possibility of 
handling negligibility since additivity implies that: 
if B >0, then for any A disjoint from B, AuB > A (**) 
Proposition 6. if;;:;: is an acceptance preorder satisfying 
( * * ), then for any three disjoint events A, B and C: 
C=A >B:::::>B=0. 
Thus, if;;:;: is additive, C =A > B ::::::> B = 0. 
Proof : C = A > B => A = A u B . By (**), B = 0. Moreover, any 
additive relation satisfies (**). 
Hence as soon as equivalence is allowed between disjoint 
events, additive accepance orders have to be very particular: 
no state can be lower than two equivalent states, except if 
it is null. In summary, assuming additivity+ acceptance 
rules out most of the numerical theories of uncertainty, that 
define a complete preorder between events, i.e. where 
disjoint events can be equivalent. Moreover, the notion of 
additivy is incompatible with the notion of negligibility 
that pertains to several theories of uncertainty (e.g., 
Lehmann, 1996) . 
So, if we do not want to restrict our framework to additive 
confidence relations, we have to extend the representation 
theorem, showing that any (possibly partial) acceptance 
preorder is equivalent to a family of complete acceptance 
preorders. The fact that a partial preorder is equivalent to a 
family of preorders is obvious. The important point is that 
the semantics of acceptance partial preorders is defined in 
terms of complete acceptance preorders, be the original 
partial order additive or not. 
Theorem 2: Any acceptance preorder ;;:;: can be 
represented by a family F(;;:;:) of complete acceptance 
preorders ;::::1 such that: A;;:;: B <=> \:f ;;:;:1E F(;;:;:), A ;;:;:1B. 
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Sketch of the proof: First, we show that for any acceptance 
preorder 2:: there IS a complete acceptance preorder 2::' such that A ;::: 
B � A 2::' B and A > B � A >' B. 2::' agrees with 2::, in the sense 
that it transforms some incomparable events A � B into comparable 
ones (in fact, A � B into either A > B or A < B). 2::' is said to be 
more discriminant than 2:: iff i t  agrees with it  and 3A,B such that A � 
B and A >' B: The idea is to introduce for some selected A� B pair a new constramt of the form A >'B and close the obtained more 
discriminating relation via transitivity and Ac. Since this closure 
provably does not introduce any contradiction (such as B >' A), the 
procedure continues by selecting a new C � D pair and so on, until 
no such pair remains. Considering the family F(<::) of complete 
preorders that the procedure can generate by changing the selection 
of A� B pairs and deciding B > A instead of A > B, we prove the 
theorem above. 
The above result still holds is we restrict to the subfamily 
of maximally discriminant complete acceptance preorders. 
Conversely, it is easy to show that: 
Proposition 7: Let F be a non empty set of complete 
acceptance preorders such that \1' ;;::, , ;;::g E F, A ::1B �A =gB. The order ;;::F defined by: A ;;::FB iff \1' ;;::1 E F, A 
;;::FB is an acceptance preorder. 
These results extend the ones of (Friedman and Halpern 
1996), and generalizes the ones of Benferhat et al. (1997a) 
that capture system P by linear possibility orders. 
S. NUMERICAL REPRESENTATIONS 
OF ACCEPTANCE 
The previous result shows that the definition of a partial 
confidence order that satisfies deductive closure of accepted 
beliefs comes down to the definition of a set of complete 
acceptance preorders. Our generalisation is thus in 
accordance with usual semantics of system P, although 
more general. But this is of no use in terms of cost of 
representation, since representing many preorders can be as 
costly as representing a partial order. One of the main 
interests of usual confidence measures is that they can be 
defined more economically, from a distribution (a mass 
assignment for Shafer's belief functions, a possibility 
distribution for possibility measures, etc.). That is why 
we focus here on the charaterization of numerical 
confidence measures that agree with deductive closure. 
Since S is supposed to be finite, any acceptance complete 
preorder can be mapped to a numerical scale. We recover 
context tole rant acceptance functions (Dubois, Prade 
1995b): 
Definition 3: An acceptance function f is a [0, 1 ]-valued 
set function such that 
• f(S) = 1 and f((l)) = 0; 
• if As;; B, f(!}) ;;::Rf(A); 
• iff(A) >Rf( A)andf(B) >R f( B) then f(AnB) > Rf( Au B). 
An acceptance function is said to be context-tolerant iff 
• f(AuB)>Rf( C)and f(AuC) >Rf(B) �f(A) >Rf(BuC) 
where > R and ;;::R are the usual orders on real numbers. 
A context tolerant acceptance function f obviously 
defines a normalized acceptance complete preorder ;;::1 as 
follows: A ;;::,B iff f(A) ;;::R f(B) . . 
Well-known confidence relations are usually specialized by 
specifying a stability property on the relation A � B with 
respect to adding new elements to sets A and B or deleting 
common elements: the additivity property comes from the 
conjunction of two weaker properties (Dubois, 1986): 
Definition 4. Let A, B and C be such that 
An(BuC)=(l). 
•;;:: is a relation of type OR iff : B;;:: C � AuB;;:: AuC 
•;;:: is a relation of type AND iff : AuB;;:: AuC � B;;:: C 
• ;;:: is additive iff it is of both types AND and OR. 
Comparative probabilities are additive confidence relation. 
Possibility orders are of type OR, while the dual orders 
(necessity orders) are of type AND: they are generally not 
additive. Weakest versions of type AND and OR can be 
given, that are characteristic of Shafer's belief functions 
and plausibility measures (Wong et al 1991): 
Definition 5. Let A, B and C be three disjoint events. 
;;:: is a relation of type 
Weak AND iff: A u B > B �A u B u C > B u C. 
Weak OR iff: A u B u C > B u C �A u B > B 
In fact, only few of these confidence measures are 
compatible with deductive closure without any restriction. 
As previously stated, necessity measures and possibility 
measures are fully in accordance with the axiomatics of 
acceptance. In contrast, only probability measures P such 
that 'II A 3s E A such that P({s }) > P(A \ {s }) are context­
tolerant acceptance functions. This leads to very special 
probability measures generally inducing a linear order on 
states, and such that the probability of a state is much 
bigger than the probability of the next probable state 
(Snow 1994, Benferhat et al 1997a) - they can be called 
"big-stepped" probabilities. Namely, let S = {s1, ... ,sn} 
with P( { s1}) > . . .  > P( { sr-d) � P( { sr}) > P({ sr+l}) = ... = 
P(  { sn}) 
= 
0, then P is a context-tolerant acceptance 
function iff: Vi < r- 1, P( { s.}) > "" ._. 1 P({ s. }). 1 L J-1+ ,n J 
This situation is related to property (**), that is actually 
induced by Weak AND property. Indeed, as soon as the 
Weak AND property is assumed, Proposition 6 holds. 
Thus C = A > B = D > 0 cannot be expressed for 
mutually disjoint events using a set function that satisfies 
weak AND. In the context of a complete preorder, this 
property has drastic effects since it enforces a linear 
ordering on the non impossible states. In other terms, 
acceptance complete preorders of this type correspond to 
very special confidence functions. 
This restriction not only applies to qualitative 
probabilities, that obviously satisfy Weak AND, but also 
to Shafer 's belief functions (the weak AND relation is 
actually characteristic of Shafer's belief functions). The 
class of belief functions obeying the acceptance axioms 
can be precisely specified in terms of the structure of the 
focal sets (sets with positive mass). First, let us recall the 
following result about acceptance belief (resp. plausibility) 
functions (indeed any context-tolerant acceptance belief 
(resp. plausibility) function is an acceptance belief (resp. 
plausibility) function). 
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Proposition 8 (Dubois, Prade 1995b): 
A belief function Bel (as well as its dual plausibility 
function Pl), with basic probability assignment m, is an 
acceptance function based on a kernel K = n{A, Bel( A) > 
Bel( A)}= n{A, Pl(A) > Pl( A)} if and only_jj: i) either K is a singleton s.t. m(K) > 2_ A c [(m( A )  
(then K is the kernel and IKI = 1 ). 
-
ii) or any focal subset F of Bel is such that F ;;;;] K 
where K is a focal subset such that IKI � 2 
iii) or the only focal subsets are {WK), {w'K} with 
m({wK}) = m({w'K}), and possibly supersets of K = 
{wK,w'K}· 
Let us call minimal focal set a focal set that does not 
contain other focal sets. It can be shown that: 
Proposition 9: A belief function defines an acceptance 
preorder (i.e., is a context tolerant acceptance function) iff 
the following requirements hold: 
• Only one minimal focal set can contain more that 
one element (other ones must be singletons). 
• The minimal focal sets are strictly ordered and the 
less important one is the one that is not a singleton. In 
other terms, the mass assignment for minimal focal sets is 
of the form: m({sl}) > .. .. > m({si}) > m({si+l, ... , sk}) > 
m({sk+l }) = ... = m({sn}) = 0 where S = {sl, ... , sn} is 
the set of states and the sum of masses is one. 
• The mass assignment defines a "big-stepped" belief 
function, i.e., for any minimal focal set {sj}: m({sj}) = 
Bel({sj)) > Bel({sj+l, ... , sm}) = L As;;{sj+l, ., sm} m(A). 
Necessity measures are among this class: they have a 
single minimal focal set. But some acceptance-like belief 
functions are not necessity measures. 
Hence, belief functions are rather incompatible with the 
requirement of acceptance. But the dual measures -
plausibility measure ou equivalently confidence preorders 
of type weak OR are not constrained by the trivializing 
Proposition 6. The study of these context-tolerant 
acceptance plausibility functions cannot derive from the 
study of the belief functions, because the dual of a context 
tolerant acceptance function is not necessarily a context 
tolerant acceptance function (although the dual of an 
acceptance function is an acceptance function). 
The above Proposition 9 pertains actually to the geometric 
conditioning of belief functions (i.e., Bel(BIA) = 
Bel(AnB)/ Bel(A)), since the requirement of context­
tolerant acceptance is applied to the belief relation. 
Applied to a plausibility relation, the requirement exploits 
Dempster rule of conditioning (i.e., PI(BIA) = Pl(AnB)/ 
Pl(A)). To obtain context-tolerant acceptance plausibility 
functions, it is enough to start from Proposition 8 which 
specifies all plausibility functions which are acceptance 
functions, and then to require that the Dempster 
conditioning of such !unctions should yield an acceptance 
function again. This method provides us with generic 
examples of context-tolerant plausibility functions: 
Example 1: There are k:::::O minimal focal elements 
which are singletons. After a suitable renumbering of the 
elements of S assume m( { s1}) > ... >m({ sk}), and the 
other focal elements Eh form a nested structure. Moreover 
the following condition should hold: 
Vi, m({si}) > L j=i+l k m({sj}) + L Ei m(EJ), 
The E1 in the sum are those Eh which do not contain 
elements s1 to si. 
Example 2: The structure of the focal elements is 
centered in the following way: there is a kernel focal 
element K and the other focal elements are either nested 
inside K, or contains K and are of the form F= Kv { si} 
where the si 's are distinct elements of S which are not 
focal elements; moreover they should satisfy the 
condition: 
Vi, m(Kv{si}) > Lj=i+l,r m(Kv{sj}), with m(Kv{sd)> 
... >m(Kv{ sr} ). 
These two examples illustrate the fact that context-tolerant 
plausibility functions combine big-stepped probabilities 
and possibility-like nested structures. It is also worth 
pointing out that extremely simple basic mass assignment 
structures do not yield context tolerant acceptance 
plausibility functions. For instance, consider a structure 
made of only two disjoint focal elements. Then at least 
one should be a singleton and have a mass strictly greater 
than the other (except if the other is itself a singleton), in 
order to define a context tolerant plausibility. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The most general, yet meaningful, representations of 
partial belief are preorders of events monotonic with 
inclusion, that can be viewed as families of complete 
preorders, hence as families of confidence functions. The 
only useful part of a preorder on events for the purpose of 
capturing the set of accepted beliefs is its strict part 
restricted to disjoint events, and requesting that it be 
deductively closed enforces the Ac axiom, which in turn 
enforces all properties of nonmonotonic preferential 
inference. We thus agree with Friedman and Halpern 
(1996) that give a central role to the CAND axiom: in the 
context of very natural requirements on the order on events 
(T and MI), the axiom of deductive closure enforces the 
other properties of system P (except RR, that is not 
required here). 
This leaves little room for most numerical theories of 
uncertainty. Most probability functions, most 
plausibility functions and most belief functions fall out of 
the range of acceptance functions. This contrasts with 
possibility theory that is fully consistent with a logical 
handling of accepted beliefs. 
However, there exist acceptance structures which are more 
general than possibility measures, not fully characterized 
yet, which �re complete acceptance orders. Indeed, as 
explained in Section 4 (see Proposition 5), acceptance 
orders actually obey a highly "possibilistic" property: for 
any three disjoint events A, B and C, if ;;?; is a complete 
acceptance preorder, then C = A > B => A =A v B = C = 
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C u B  > B. When considering complete preorders, like 
those induced by numerical representations, it can hardly 
be assumed that no pair of disjoint events (e.g. no pair of 
states) is equivalent. Thus there may be some non null 
events such that A = AuB. In other terms, either the 
ordering never allows to have equivalent disjoint events, 
and is thus restricted to very to very special confidence 
functions, or it assumes that some events are negligible in 
front of others (here B, in front of A and C). 
These results are quite negative regarding the general 
compatibility between logical representation of beliefs, 
viewed as accepted propositions, that use the usual notion 
of deductive closure for representing implicit beliefs, and 
numerical representations based on set-functions for 
reasoning about partial belief. It is a severe impediment to 
a generalized view of theory revision based on orders on 
formulae derived from uncertainty theories other than 
epistemic entrenchments, simply because the assumption 
of closed belief sets is devastating in this respect. 
One possible conclusion is that the notion of closed belief 
set is not fully adapted to the modelling of belief, not only 
because this notion disregards syntactic aspects (as 
advocated by tenants of syntactic revision and opponents 
to the logical omniscience assumption), but because the 
closure under conjunction is not always intuitively 
plausible when reasoning with partial beliefs (as already 
revealed in the lottery paradox). Weaker types of "deductive 
closures" might be considered for this purpose as for 
instance unions of standard deductively closed sets of 
propositions (that may be globally inconsistent). This 
type of closure is encountered in argument-based reasoning 
under inconsistency (Benferhat et al 1997b). Tolerating 
inconsistency is indeed incompatible with standard 
deductive closure. It turns out that most confidence 
measures (and noticeably probabilities) synthetize partially 
conflicting pieces of information while possibility 
measures do not. It may explain why the latter seem to be 
the only simple ones that sanction the concept of belief 
set, where inconsistency is banished. 
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